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Abstract
When individuals differ in both productivity and some categorical attribute,
optimal linear/piecewise-linear tax expressions are written to capture cases
where it is suboptimal to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal
value of income between categorical groups. Simulations provide examples.
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1. Introduction
When individuals differ in both their productivity and some categorical
dimension such as disability, a well-established result is that categorical trans-
fers should be set so as to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal
value of income (smvi) between categorical groups (Diamond and Sheshin-
ski, 1995; Parsons, 1996). The linear income tax framework has played an
important role in the analysis of categorical transfers: proponents of flat
tax schedules cite their administrative simplicity and enhanced work incen-
tives; whilst analytically a flat tax captures the equity-efficiency tradeoff of
income taxation more tractably than nonlinear taxation (Atkinson, 1995;
Paulus and Peichl, 2009).2 The resulting optimal tax formulae are typically
reported under the assumption that inequality in the average net smvi is in-
1E-mail address: ses34@st-andrews.ac.uk , Tel: + 44 (0) 1334 468305
2Mirrlees (1971, p.208) discusses the desirability of approximately linear tax schedules.
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deed eliminated at the optimum (Viard, 2001). This assumption allows the
optimal tax expression to be written as in the uni-dimensional model where
individuals differ only in productivity: the numerator (equity considerations)
is the negative of the covariance between earnings and the net smvi; whilst
the denominator (efficiency considerations) captures the compensated labour
supply response to a change in the net wage rate.
However, it is not immediately clear that this between-group inequality
will always be eliminated at the optimum. Indeed, there may be cases where
it is suboptimal to do so: if a sufficiently large fraction of the population are
dependent on categorical transfers for consumption then the level of taxation
required to equate the average net smvi of dependent and non-dependent
groups may be too harmful to the latter group. This will also depend on the
size of any revenue requirement for spending outside welfare.
Moreover, this is likely to hold beyond a simple flat tax framework. For
example, progressive piecewise linear tax systems provide the government
with additional tools to redistribute within categorical groups; but if shifting
some of the tax burden away from lower earners in an able group: (i) pushes
the average net smvi of that group further below that of a dependent group;
and/or (ii) lowers tax revenue relative to the flat tax case, this may limit
further the cases where it is optimal to eliminate between-group inequality.
This paper addresses this issue in both linear and piecewise linear in-
come tax frameworks. It demonstrates that the optimal tax expressions can
be written more generally to allow for cases where the average net smvi of
categorical groups are not equated at the optimum. In these cases welfare
provision is purely categorical, such that no universal benefit is provided. Al-
ternatively, if between-group inequality is eliminated and there are resources
left over a universal benefit is also provided. This reflects somewhat the
ordering of priorities in real-world welfare systems: whilst most systems fea-
ture dimensions of both categorical and universal support, the former plays
the prominent role. Extensive numerical simulations provide examples where
between-group inequality is not eliminated at the optimum. Further, they
indicate that it is more likely to arise under a progressive piecewise system
for the reasons outlined above.
2
2. The Model
2.1. Background
Individual preferences over consumption, x ≥ 0, and leisure, l ∈ [0, 1], are
represented by the utility function u(x, l). The standard assumptions apply:
u is continuous; differentiable; increasing in both arguments (ux > 0, ul > 0)
and concave (uxx < 0 , ull < 0 , uxxull − u2xl > 0); with both goods normal
(uluxx − uxuxl < 0).
For an individual with net wage ω ≥ 0 and unearned income M ≥ 0 ,
optimal labour supply (H∗) and the resulting indirect utility function (v) are
defined by:
H∗(ω,M) ≡ arg max
H∈(0,1)
u(ωH +M, 1−H) ,
v(ω,M) ≡ u(ωH∗ +M, 1−H∗) .
Let ω¯(M) = ul(M, 1)/ux(M, 1) be the reservation wage satisfying: H
∗ =
0 ∀ ω ≤ ω¯ and H∗ > 0 ∀ ω > ω¯ ; where ω¯′ > 0. It follows that ∀ ω < ω¯
: v(ω,M) = u(M, 1) and thus vM(ω,M) = ux(M, 1). Contrastingly, Roy’s
identity (vω = vMH
∗) and the normality of leisure (H∗M < 0) imply that
∀ ω > ω¯ : vωM = vMMH∗ + vMH∗M < 0. So for ω > ω¯ the marginal indirect
utility of unearned income is strictly decreasing in the net wage rate.
2.2. The Tax-Benefit System
Consider a population of size 1, where a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of individuals
face a zero quantity constraint on labour supply and are thus unable to work.
Absent any form of state financial provision these individuals would have zero
income to consume. The remaining (1− θ) individuals are able to work but
differ in their underlying productivity n ≥ 0, where n is distributed with
density function f(n) and associated distribution function F (n).
The government operates a tax-benefit system comprising: (i) a constant
marginal income tax rate t ∈ (0, 1); (ii) a tax-free universal benefit B ≥ 0
received unconditionally by all individuals in society; and (iii) a tax-free
categorical benefit C ≥ 0 that is perfectly targeted at unable individuals.
Let y(n, 1 − t,M) ≡ nH∗[n(1 − t),M ] be the gross earnings of a pro-
ductivity n individual; whilst y¯(1 − t,M) ≡ ∫ yf(n)dn is the average gross
earnings of able individuals.
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Under a strictly utilitarian criterion, social welfare is:
W (t, B, C; θ) = θu(B + C, 1) + (1− θ)
∫
v[n(1− t), B]f(n)dn (1)
The government’s problem is thus described by:
max
t,B,C
W (t, B, C; θ)
s.t. B + θC = (1− θ)t · y¯(t, B)−R ,
t ∈ (0, 1) , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 .
(2)
where R ≥ 0 is an exogenous revenue requirement.
To discuss the results which follow, let the net smvi of a productivity n
individual be (Viard, 2001; Atkinson, 1995):
s(n, t,M, λ) =
{
ux(M, 1) : n ≤ n¯(t,M)
vM [n(1− t),M ] + λtyM(n, 1− t,M) : n > n¯(t,M)
(3)
where n¯ ≡ ω¯/(1 − t) and λ is the shadow price of public expenditure. For
working individuals s captures - in welfare units - the fact that an increase
in unearned income induces a worker to reduce their labour supply and,
consequently, lowers tax revenue.
Letting tˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ be the optima resulting from (2), we have:
Result 1:
(i) Cˆ > 0 and Bˆ ≥ 0 satisfy :
s¯
(
tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
)
≤ ux
(
Bˆ + Cˆ, 1
)
= λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (4)
where the pair of inequalities holds with complementary slackness and
λˆ is the shadow price of public expenditure at the optimum.
(ii) For β ≡ (λ− s¯) and r = y/y¯; tˆ is implicitly characterised by:
tˆ
1− tˆ =

β − Cov(r, s)
λˆ
∫
rEcf(n)dn : β > 0
−Cov(y, s)
λˆ
∫
yEcf(n)dn : β = 0
(5)
where Ec is the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to the
net of tax rate.
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Result 1(i) states that, budget allowing, C should be set so as to elim-
inate inequality in the average net smvi between the unable and able sub-
populations (see Viard, 2001). Further, so long as there is inequality in this
dimension it is optimal to set B = 0 because social welfare can be increased
more through targeting resources at the unable.
Next, Result 1(ii) provides a general expression for the optimal linear tax
rate that captures the equity (numerator) - efficiency (denominator) tradeoff
inherent in income taxation. This differs from standard linear tax expres-
sions whenever β > 0, and thus whenever there is inequality in the average
net smvi between the unable and able subpopulations. In this case, the nu-
merator is composed of two terms. The first is β itself, which will be larger
the greater is the between-group disparity at the optimum. The second is
the covariance between relative earnings (r) and the net smvi. Notice that
Cov(r, s) · y¯ = Cov(y, s), where the latter term is found in all linear tax for-
mulae and captures a desire to redistribute from those of high productivity
to those of lower productivity.3 The intuition for these two terms is that
the presence of a dependent subpopulation shifts the equity focus away from
disparities in earnings ability within the able subpopulation, and towards the
between-group disparity in the average net smvi.
The denominator in (5) is unambiguously positive. Ceteris paribus, higher
compensated elasticities of labour supply imply lower tax rates, with empha-
sis placed on both very high productivities and productivities at which the
population is most dense.
2.3. A Progressive Piecewise Linear Income Tax System
Whilst a number of countries adopt a flat income tax, the majority employ
progressive piecewise linear tax schedules (see Paulus and Peichl, 2009). This
section motivates the idea that the above discussion is likely to hold in a more
general setting. The next section then illustrates this numerically.
Let there be an earnings threshold Y and two tax rates t1 ≤ t2 such that
an individual’s budget constraint is:
x =
{
(1− t1)y +B : y ≤ Y
(t2 − t1)Y + (1− t2)y +B : y > Y
The tax-benefit system remains otherwise as in Section 2.2.
3This covariance will be negative if: (i) yn ≥ 0; and (ii) sn < 0.
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To progress it is helpful to abstract from income effects4 through assuming
preferences take the form:
U(x,H) = u (x− g(H)) ; u′ > 0 , u′′ < 0 , g′ > 0 , g′′ > 0 (6)
As is well documented (Apps et al., 2014), there will be a ‘bunching’
of earnings at Y for individuals who would earn more than Y if additional
earnings were still taxed at rate t1; but choose not to because they are in
fact taxed at rate t2. Formally, this bunching occurs for n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n] ; where:
n˜(1− t1) ≡ g′ (Y/n˜) , ˜˜n(1− t2) ≡ g′
(
Y/˜˜n
)
(7)
and for n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n): (1− t1) > g′(Y/n) > (1− t2).
Individuals with n ∈ (0, n˜] choose y ≤ Y so that n(1 − t1) = g′(y/n);
whilst individuals with n ∈ (˜˜n,∞) choose y > Y so that n(1− t2) = g′(y/n).
If we denote by v(n, t1, t2, Y,M) the indirect utility resulting from the
optimal choice of y we can establish that:
∂v
∂t1
=
{
−vMy : n ∈ (0, n˜]
−vMY : n ∈ (n˜,∞)
;
∂v
∂t2
=
{
0 : n ∈ (0, ˜˜n]
−vM · (y − Y ) : n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
and:
∂v
∂Y
=

0 : n ∈ (0, n˜]
vM · (1− t1)− g′(Y/n)/n > 0 : n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n]
vM · (t2 − t1) > 0 : n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
As we are abstracting from income effects, an individual’s smvi is s = vM
and once more s¯ =
∫
sf(n)dn.
The government’s optimisation problem is now:
max
t1,t2,Y,B,C
W = θu(B + C) + (1− θ)
∫
v(n, t1, t2, Y, B)f(n)dn
s.t. B + θC
= (1− θ)
{
t1
〈∫ n˜
yf(n)dn+ Y [1− F (n˜)]
〉
+ t2
∫
˜˜n
(y − Y )f(n)dn
}
−R ,
t1 ∈ (0, 1) , t2 ∈ (0, 1) , t1 ≤ t2 , Y ≥ 0 , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 . (8)
4This ensures that the f.o.c. for earnings y > Y is unaffected by t1, which simplifies
the analysis (see Apps et al., 2014).
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Letting tˆ1,tˆ2,Yˆ ,Bˆ and Cˆ denote the resulting optima, we have:
Result 2:
(i) Cˆ > 0 and Bˆ ≥ 0 satisfy:
s¯
(
tˆ1, tˆ2, Yˆ , Bˆ
)
≤ u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
= λˆ (9)
(ii) For Ei = (1− ti)
y
∂y
∂(1− ti) ; i ∈ {1, 2}, tˆ1, tˆ2 and Yˆ are characterised by:
(t1) :
tˆ1
1− tˆ1
=
βYˆ +
∫ n˜
(Y − y) (s− λˆ)f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ n˜
yE1f(n)dn
(10)
(t2) :
tˆ2
1− tˆ2
=
∫
˜˜n
(
y − Yˆ
)
(λˆ− s)f(n)dn
λˆ
∫
˜˜n
yE2f(n)dn
(11)
(Y ) :
∫ ˜˜n
n˜
(
∂v
∂Y
+ λˆtˆ1
)
f(n)dn =
(
tˆ2 − tˆ1
) ∫
˜˜n
(
λˆ− s
)
f(n)dn (12)
Result 2(i) parallels Result 1(i): a universal benefit will only be provided con-
ditional on categorical transfers eliminating inequality in the average smvi.
Result 2(ii) characterises the optimal tax parameters and is analogous to
Apps et al. (2014). The important difference with these authors is that the
presence of a dependent population changes how we write the expression for
tˆ1. In particular, whilst both the expressions for tˆ1 and tˆ2 have equity con-
cerns in the numerator and efficiency concerns in the denominator, it is only
the numerator of the former than contains β; entering as βY . The intuition
is seemingly that an increase in t1 has no distortionary effect on the gross
earnings of those with n ∈ (n˜,∞) and is therefore an effective tool to help
reduce β. This does, of course, come at the cost of imposing a higher tax rate
on those with n ∈ (0, n˜) and thus those with lower productivities. Finally,
(12) illustrates that Y should be set so as to equate (i) the marginal benefit
of allowing individuals with n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n) to work more at rate t1 (and in welfare
units the associated increase in tax revenue); with (ii) the marginal cost of
foregone tax revenue from those with n ∈ (˜˜n,∞), weighted by the positive
term
∫
˜˜n
(λ− s)f(n)dn.
3. Numerical Simulations
The optimal tax expressions in Section 2 are endogenous to the tax rate,
thus rendering comparative statics predictions scarce. To provide examples
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where β > 0 at the optimum, we therefore turn to numerical methods.
Following Saez (2001) and Atkinson (1995) let preferences be of the iso-
elastic form:
u(x,H) = log
(
x− αH
1+k
1 + k
)
(13)
where in this setting 1/k is the constant elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the net wage rate and α is a constant. Low labour elasticities are
observed empirically and we follow convention by setting 1/k = 0.25.
Productivities are Pareto distributed where f(n) = µnµ/nµ+1 ∀ n ≥ n.
The Pareto distribution captures well the upper tail of observed income dis-
tributions and its adoption in the more recent optimal tax literature has
supported increasing marginal tax rates on higher earners.5 It would there-
fore seem appropriate for simulating progressive piecewise tax schedules. To
capture how the spread of abilities affects the results, we consider two alter-
native distributions: (i) n = 1, µ = 4 ; and (ii) n = 1.067, µ = 5, where n is
adjusted so that the average productivity is 1.333 in both cases. The second
distribution has a smaller spread of abilities than the first.
The remaining parameter choices are α = 8 ; θ ∈ {0.10, 0.15} and R ∈
{0, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}. The leisure preference parameter α is set so that the
average worker works roughly 2/3 of their time endowment. The values of
the unable subpopulation size θ seem sensible following statistics on real-
world welfare programs (Mcinnes, 2012). Finally, R = 0.2 corresponds to
17% of maximum GDP (average productivity) when θ = 0.1.
Table 1 displays the numerical results and its structure is described in
the caption immediately below the table. The most immediate observation
is that there are indeed cases under both the flat tax and piecewise linear
tax schedules where β > 0 at the optimum. The existence of a critical flat
tax t∗ that generates just enough tax revenue to set β = 0 illustrates that
it is certainly possible to eliminate inequality in the average smvi; but this
option may not be exercised because such a tax rate hurts able individuals
too much. Moreover, there are a number of cases where β = 0 under the flat
tax schedule, but β > 0 under the corresponding piecewise schedule. The
intuition is clear: under the piecewise system the government has additional
5Extensive numerical results with alternative functional forms (e.g. CES) and distri-
butions (e.g. LogNormal) provide further examples where β > 0 and are available from
the author upon request. Python 2.7 was used for the numerical analysis.
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tools to affect the distribution of earnings within the able subpopulation.
Setting t1 < t2 shifts some of the tax burden away from lower productiv-
ity individuals and towards higher productivity individuals, thus lowering s¯
relative to that under the flat tax optimum. Even though the unable re-
ceive a similar benefit income to the flat tax case, β is necessarily higher
due to the fall in s¯. In these cases net tax revenue is also lower under the
piecewise schedule. Note that where β > 0 under both types of system, the
unable tend to receive a slightly lower level of categorical support under the
piecewise system than they do under the flat tax system. Finally, given that
the flat tax is always available but not chosen, welfare is higher under the
piecewise system (to save on space this is omitted from the table).
Table 1 illustrates that an increase in θ or R increases the number of
cases where β > 0. Interestingly, a mean-preserving reduction in the spread
of abilities increases : (i) the number of cases where β > 0; and (ii) the
magnitude of β for cases where β > 0 already. This arises because, for
any given value of t, both s¯ and tax revenue fall. Consequently, the critical
tax rate t∗ at which between-group inequality is eliminated rises.6 Figure 1
summarizes the conditions where β > 0 in (R, θ) space.
Example with Income Effects. The numerical examples where β > 0
continue to hold if we introduce income effects. Let preferences be (Saez,
2001):
u(x,H) = log(x)− α log
(
1 +
H1+k
1 + k
)
where α = 8 and 1/k = 0.25. Table 2 presents results for the flat tax case.
[FIGURE 1 HERE (scale=0.45), Caption: Between-Group Inequality at
the Optimum in (R, θ) Space ]
4. Concluding Remarks
To summarise, the analysis of categorical transfers in linear/piecewise lin-
ear income tax frameworks generates optimal tax expressions that depend on
whether or not categorical transfers eliminate inequality in the average smvi
across categorical groups. Numerical simulations provide examples where it
is suboptimal to finance categorical transfers up to this point: such as when
6Note that t∗ would still rise even if we did not adjust n so as to keep mean productivity
constant (for any given t: s¯ may increase but tax revenue falls).
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Table 2: Flat Tax Optima with Income Effects
R tˆ Bˆ Cˆ β s¯ t∗
(a) n = 1 , µ = 4 , θ = 0.15
0 0.235 0.073 0.662 0 1.360 0.146
0.10 0.263 0 0.652 0.010 1.525 0.264
0.20 0.376 0 0.552 0.103 1.710 0.381
(b) n = 1.067 , µ = 5 , θ = 0.15
0 0.167 0.015 0.733 0 1.336 0.149
0.10 0.263 0 0.651 0.048 1.487 0.267
0.20 0.376 0 0.551 0.149 1.665 0.384
there is a sufficiently large dependent population and/or the government has
spending commitments outside welfare. How these optimal tax expressions
change when categorical transfers are administered with classification errors
- and thus where it may be impossible to eliminate inequality in the average
smvi - warrants investigation.
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